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At least rhetorically, sanitation is rising up the agenda of the
international development community. Basic sanitation has
been recognized as a human right (United Nations General
Assembly, 2010), and universal access is being proposed as a
global target for 2030 or thereabouts (The High-Level Panel
of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda,
2013; WaterAid, 2013). By way of contrast, the target of halv-
ing, during 1990–2015, the share of the world’s population
without access to “improved” sanitation was added somewhat
late to the Millennium Development Goals, with only water
and not sanitation mentioned in the original Millennium
Declaration (United Nations General Assembly, 2000).
Moreover, while oﬃcial statistics indicate that the world has
already met the water target by ensuring that at least 88% of
the world’s population has access to “improved” water
supplies, it is not meeting the sanitation target, although that
would only require 75% coverage (WHO/UNICEF, 2014).
The oﬃcial statistics (WHO/UNICEF, 2014) show far
higher levels of improved sanitation in urban areas (80% glob-
ally in 2012) than in rural areas (47%), but this should not be
taken to imply that the sanitation deﬁciencies in urban areas
are small and declining. First, the hazards and squalor associ-
ated with unimproved sanitation are particularly acute in
urban areas, where residential densities are high. Second,
and related to this, since the hazards resulting from poor san-
itation have spill-over eﬀects, and do not just put those with-
out adequate facilities at risk, the share of urban households
facing serious sanitary problems is far more than this ﬁgure
of 80% coverage might seem to imply – especially where den-
sity and crowding combine with other shelter-deﬁciencies.
Third, there has been especially slow progress in urban areas
in recent decades, and the share with improved sanitation
has only shifted from 76% to 80% during 1990–2012. Since
urban populations have increased considerably, this means
that the number of urban dwellers without improved sanita-
tion actually increased from 547 million to 748 million over
this period (as compared to a fall from 2,175 million to
1,758 million in rural areas).242There is international agreement that bad sanitation is
degrading, disagreeable, unhealthy and far too prevalent, even
in urban areas. There is widespread disagreement, however,
over what should be done. Moreover, the most heated debates,
such as those over whether utility operators should be private
or public, are of doubtful relevance to the most severe chal-
lenges. Neither privately nor publicly operated utilities are
inclined to provide aﬀordable sanitation to those most in need,
even in urban areas (Budds & McGranahan, 2003). Indeed, by
focusing attention on technologies (e.g., conventional sewer-
age systems) and institutional forms (e.g., centralized utilities)
that are better suited to providing higher cost sanitation to
well-oﬀ populations, these debates have inadvertently diverted
attention from those most in need.
Conventional sewerage systems operated by utilities rarely
reach more than a small share of residents in the cities of
low-income countries, with costs diﬃcult to cover even when
user payments are supplemented with public subsidies. Thus,
while an estimated 72% of Latin American urban households
have a sewer connection, as do a large share of China’s urban
households, in most countries in South and Southeast Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa, the share is less than 10% (Kjelle´n,
Pensulo, Nordqvist, & Fogde, 2012). With a radical redistribu-
tion of power and wealth, it is easy to imagine utilities rolling
out high cost sanitations to everyone, but in its absence low-
cost alternatives will be necessary if anything like universal
provision is to be attained.
Technically, signiﬁcant improvements can be made using
lower cost sanitation systems, such as well-made pit latrines
in peri-urban areas, and pour-ﬂush latrines with simple tanks
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water treatment systems (Gutterer, Sasse, Panzerbieter, &
Reckerzu¨gel, 2009) and condominial sewers (Melo, 2005)
in more densely settled areas. However, low-cost provision
poses institutional challenges that neither utilities nor pri-
vate enterprises are equipped to address. It is the integrated
piped networks that allow for the centralized and integrated
control of water and sanitation systems, which water and
sanitation utilities developed with and still aspire to. Low-
cost systems are typically based on decentralized on-site
facilities, and unlike conventional sewerage systems require
users to contribute signiﬁcantly to their operation and man-
agement. Most utilities are poorly prepared to manage these
decentralized systems. Alternatively, since sanitation is a
quasi-public good, markets do not aggregate individual
demands eﬀectively and do not motivate commercial enter-
prises to supply adequate sanitation.
These institutional diﬃculties are compounded by the low
incomes of the deprived populations, which constrain their
economic demand, and by their political weaknesses, which
constrain their ability to exert policy pressure on public agen-
cies and utilities. The fact that sanitation problems fall more
heavily on women and children than on adult men probably
amplify these economic and political hindrances (Tacoli,
2012).
Ideally, better organized residents could overcome some of
these institutional deﬁciencies, and indeed community-led
sanitation has also received considerable attention over the
years, and has been vigorously promoted in some settlements
(Mehta & Movik, 2011). But community-driven sanitary
improvement also faces serious challenges in urban settle-
ments, including: (1) The collective action challenge of getting
local residents to coordinate and combine their demands for
sanitary improvement; (2) The coproduction challenge of
getting the state to accept and support community-driven
approaches to sanitary improvement, and where necessary to
co-invest and take responsibility for the ﬁnal waste disposal;
(3) The challenge of agreeing on improvements when what is
aﬀordable is rarely considered acceptable to either the public
authorities or the communities; (4) The challenge of ensuring
that other poverty-related problems, such as insecure tenure,
do not undermine eﬀorts to improve sanitation.
A recent review found that “The framing of water and san-
itation as a human right can be understood as an aﬃrmation
of the fundamental importance of water and sanitation for
human dignity, and as a response to global water service
trends that have increasingly emphasized eﬃciency, ﬁnancial
sustainability, and privatization” (Murthy, 2013). This
aﬃrmation is welcome, as is the shift in attention away from
narrowly deﬁned economic approaches. On the other hand,
the growing focus on rights is part of a more questionable ten-
dency to advocate for “rights-based” approaches (Kindornay,
Ron, & Carpenter, 2012). What this means is still debated,
although there is now a handbook from the Oﬃce of the High
Commission on Human Rights on realizing the right to water
and sanitation, including a 44 page booklet of checklists (Roaf
et al., 2014). Given the nature of the political and institutional
challenges to improving sanitation, a narrowly legalistic or
formulaic version of a rights-based approach is unlikely to
be appropriate. For some one of the attractions of a rights-
based approach is that it entails political transformation
(Uvin, 2007), but many of the core processes are ﬁrmly legal-
istic and somewhat formulaic. In any case, this paper is less
concerned with which approaches to sanitation improvement
should be termed rights based, important though that may
be, and more concerned with the local political, institutional,physical and economic obstacles that need to be overcome if
the right to sanitation is to be achieved.
The challenges to low-cost sanitation improvement in
deprived urban settlements are analyzed in some detail in
the pages that follow, focusing on their institutional and eco-
nomic dimensions and how they can be overcome. The report
ends with a section on what these challenges imply for realiz-
ing the human right to safe and clean sanitation. The ways in
which two well-known community-driven initiatives managed
to overcome these challenges are summarized brieﬂy, and
shown to contrast signiﬁcantly with narrowly deﬁned rights-
based approaches. However, whether or not they are rights
based, they are rights fulﬁlling, and are consistent with a more
broadly conceived and politically sophisticated rights agenda.2. THECHALLENGEOFLOCALCOLLECTIVEACTION
A concern with bad urban sanitation helped to drive the
public health movement and changed the way the industrializ-
ing cities of the 19th century were governed (Melosi, 2000;
Szreter, 2005). It is not surprising that sanitation often lags
behind household water provision (WHO/UNICEF, 2014;
Winters, Karim, & Martawardaya, 2014). It combines some
of our most private behaviors (which people tend not to like
even talking about publicly) with some of our most public
impacts (which people don’t have the incentives to do much
about individually). Sanitary facilities can in principle be con-
venient, clean, safe, and “private” from a user’s perspective,
and still impose a heavy burden on others. According to the
WHO/UNICEF monitoring program, an “improved” sanitary
facility is “one that hygienically separates human excreta from
human contact” (WHO/UNICEF, 2010, p. 34). But the most
serious consequences of not separating excreta from human
contact arise when people come into contact with the excreta
of others, not with their own. Moreover, though largely
beyond the scope of this paper, the failure to recycle nutrients
in the excreta can have ecological consequences and is inadver-
tently contributing to global resource scarcities that threaten
global sustainability (Cordell, Drangert, & White, 2009).
In those cities where a signiﬁcant share of sanitary facilities
are “unimproved”, an important part of the shared burden is
usually local. In deprived urban settlements, it is not uncom-
mon for at least some children to defecate in public spaces
such as ﬁelds or drains, for fecal material in poor-quality
latrines to be accessible to ﬂies, for pit latrines to contaminate
groundwater used for drinking or to overﬂow onto the path-
ways during the rainy season, for children to play freely and
to share facilities, and for infant feces to be disposed of with
the solid waste that remains uncollected in piles around the
neighborhood. Just a few such hazards create serious health
risks in the neighborhood, especially for infants and children.
(For a review of urban household and neighborhood hazards
in a selection of cities see McGranahan, Jacobi, Songsore,
Surjadi, & Kjelle´n, 2001.)
Households living in such neighborhoods face what
amounts to a local public goods problem. Individual house-
holds do not have suﬃcient incentive to invest and act to
improve sanitary conditions in the neighborhood because the
beneﬁts are shared. In eﬀect, the situation can arise where
every household would be better oﬀ if they all acted to
improve the sanitary conditions, but no individual household
has the incentive to improve its own sanitary facilities and
behaviors. There may also be important spill-overs between
neighborhoods and other parts of the city. Intra-household
social and health-related relations, including those of gender,
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important and extend to house compounds (Songsore &
McGranahan, 1998). But at the local scale it is easy to see
how there may be a collective demand for improved sanitation
that is not converted into behaviors and investments because
the beneﬁts any individual receives depend primarily on the
actions of others.
A household can act to protect itself by moving to a neigh-
borhood where sanitation conditions are better, or by taking
measures to isolate themselves (and particularly infants and
children) from their own neighbors. They can build a wall
around the house yard, place a household garbage container
on the other side of the wall, screen oﬀ the kitchen, spray
the house regularly to control insects, take children to play
and to be educated elsewhere, and have family members come
and go from the house in a private vehicle. This is possible for
wealthy households who abut low-income informal settle-
ments, but it is not an option most people living in informal
settlements can aﬀord. Nor is it an eﬃcient means of address-
ing the public goods problem.
In economics, the conventional textbook solution to this
sort of public goods problem is for the government to provide
adequate sanitation at subsidized prices or impose regulations
requiring house owners and occupiers to meet certain minimal
sanitation standards. In aﬄuent urban settlements this is
usually relatively straightforward to organize and agree on
politically. However, few governments in low-income
countries are willing or able to collect the taxes necessary to
subsidize prices to the point where even people living in infor-
mal settlements receive acceptable facilities at a price they can
aﬀord. The beneﬁciaries of the services and subsidies are often
the “the few relatively well-oﬀ people who can understand the
system and capture the subsidies” (Mara, Lane, Scott, &
Trouba, 2010, p. 3). Governments may be willing to pass
regulations that formally require households to achieve high
sanitary standards, probably even higher than the low-income
residents would collectively choose. All too often, however,
the result is a combination of exclusion and the emergence
of informal settlements where few regulations are enforced
(McGranahan, Mitlin, & Satterthwaite, 2008).
There are less conventional economic textbooks that recog-
nize the potential role of community organizations in such sit-
uations (Bowles, 2004). Psychological evidence indicates that
people are not self-centered, that they regularly exhibit altruis-
tic behavior, and that this altruism is evoked in collaborative
behavior (Tomasello, 2014). Communities can also elicit infor-
mation and apply incentives unavailable to markets and gov-
ernments: “Community governance relies on dispersed private
information that is often unavailable to states, employers,
banks, and other large formal organizations to apply rewards
and punishments to members according to their conformity to
social norms. In contrast to states and markets, communities
eﬀectively foster and utilize the incentives that people have tra-
ditionally deployed to regulate their common activity: trust,
solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, respect, ven-
geance, and retribution, among others” (Bowles, 2004, p. 490).
As a result, “communities solve problems that might otherwise
appear as classic market failures or state failures: namely,
insuﬃcient provision of local public goods such as neighbor-
hood amenities” (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. F422).
The potential for communities to act to address their collec-
tive sanitation problems is undoubtedly complicated by the
fact that the communities and their sanitation problems are
neither well bounded nor congruent. Proximity matters for
many sanitation burdens, but so does geography, which com-
bines in turn with technology and custom to inﬂuence wherethe impacts of poor sanitation fall. A hanging toilet over a
stream put one group of people at risk, open defecation on
a local open space may impact another group, a poorly
constructed and maintained pit latrine another, and fecal
matter disposed of along with solid waste yet another.
Moreover, the groups exposed to collective risks are unlikely
to overlap more than very roughly with the lanes that must
organize collectively to put in and manage a condominial
sewer, or with the residential neighborhoods that must orga-
nize collectively to put up and manage public toilet blocks.
There are also many local factors that can facilitate or inhi-
bit collective action in particular localities, including social,
economic, political, and geographically based divisions and
conﬂicts. For example, women often bear most of the labor
burden of maintaining household sanitation and hygiene,
and if women are underrepresented in government or pre-
vented from organizing collectively within the community,
the potential for collective action improving sanitation is likely
to be correspondingly reduced. Home ownership patterns and
landlord–tenant relations also inﬂuence the potential for local
collective action, as discussed in more detail below. And there
are many more place-speciﬁc divisions and conﬂicts, tied to
local politics, cultures, and geographies, which can undermine
collective action.
Nevertheless, given the collective nature of the sanitation
challenge, it is almost perverse that one of the most popular
approaches to improving sanitation systems in low-income
areas is called “sanitation marketing” (Devine & Kullmann,
2011). Marketing is traditionally a means of increasing private
demands. It is true that low-cost facilities tend to be on site,
and the decision to invest in them is typically made by the
house occupants or owners. However, as indicated above
many of the most critical beneﬁts of these private facilities
are public. Even if larger private demands could be created
for more sanitary local environments, those with private
demands for these public improvements could not secure them
merely by investing in their own sanitation facilities and
practices.
The popularity of sanitation marketing has probably been
given a boost by the prevalence of neoliberal ideas, and the
favoring of private sector solutions by many international
donors. Support for sanitation marketing also came from
research indicating that that people are more likely motivated
to upgrade their sanitation facilities because of their conve-
nience, smell, safety, or status, rather than because of health
beneﬁts (Jenkins & Sugden, 2006). This last could also be
taken, however, to reﬂect the fact that there is little point in
focusing the marketing on beneﬁts of sanitation that are public
in character. Sanitation campaigns relying on private action
need to focus on private beneﬁts of people’s own private
actions, which do not include public health beneﬁts of such
actions. Health can be a major, and indeed oppressive, con-
cern among women living in unsanitary low-income settle-
ments, but they may not feel capable to respond individually
(Obrist, 2006). When collaborating, collective health is far
more likely to be important, in part because collective action
does respond to the collective demand. But it is not a suitable
target for conventional marketing.
Attempts to market products whose consumption serves the
public good is part of a broader trend toward what has come
to be termed social marketing (Lefebvre, 2011). Even within
the social marketing literature, it has been recognized that
an excessive focus on individual behavioral change and a fail-
ure to engage with underlying structural problems can pro-
duce poor results (Wymer, 2011). And the successes of
sanitation marketing do not rely only on targeting individual
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sanitation marketing in two provinces in Vietnam during
2003–06, 15,000 of 32,000 households targeted gained access
to sanitary toilets, increasing access to sanitary toilets in the
pilot areas from 15% to 46%. A follow-up study found that
the share also increased substantially after the project ended
(Sijbesma, Truong, & Devine, 2010, p. iii). However, the pro-
gram involved a wide range of activities, on both the supply
and demand sides, including developing more aﬀordable sani-
tation technologies, training masons, producers, and small
shopkeepers to produce, market, and deliver these models
and, working with village heads, community health workers
and Women’s Union members to promote them (Devine &
Sijbesma, 2011). What characterized the approach was not
an emphasis on applying commercial marketing, but on
upgrading the supply side by working with the private produc-
ers of sanitary services, and upgrading the demand side by
working with various people active at the community level
(Sijbesma et al., 2010).
Even more revealing, a simpliﬁed guide to sanitation mar-
keting suggests that at the low-cost end, sanitation marketing
is equivalent to community-led total sanitation (CLTS) (Water
and Sanitation Program, 2012, p. 4), which is another very
popular approach to promoting sanitation improvements,
particularly in rural areas. However, the roots of CLTS lie
in participatory research, which is in some respects as far
removed from commercial marketing as one can get
(Kar, 2008; Mehta & Movik, 2011). CLTS is an overtly
community-based approach, and involves very much the sorts
of actions that might be expected to overcome the collective
action problems associated with neighborhood sanitation, at
least in rural settings where place-based communities are rela-
tively strong. Kamal Kar, credited with starting the CLTS
movement, places collective action at the center of CLTS.
Indeed, he suggests that the beneﬁts of CLTS lie not just in
the sanitary improvements themselves, and that “more
importantly it builds the collective strength and self-conﬁdence
of the communities to move ahead with many other local
initiatives” (Kar, 2011).
To simplify, pursuing CLTS within a community involves
four steps: (1) Collecting local evidence on sanitary conditions
and the location of feces in particular, building on the
knowledge of community members (including children); (2)
Examining that evidence publicly, in a manner designed to
“ignite” collective disgust with the ingestion of fecal matter
implied by existing conditions; (3) Building on that disgust
to reach a collective agreement on replacing all open defeca-
tion with the use of aﬀordable toilets; (4) Creating adherence
to that agreement through the traditional means by which
close communities regulate themselves, ranging from pride
and shame, to gossip and revelation, and eventually to retribu-
tion. These are very much the sort of activities that could be
expected to, at least temporarily, create collective demand
and action for sanitation improvement.
CLTS has many adherents and spread rapidly through
Bangladesh and parts of India, and on to upward of 40 other
countries around the world (Mehta & Movik, 2011). Kamal
Kar estimates that about 20 million people have beneﬁted
since CLTS started in 2000 (Kar, 2011), and is very sanguine
about its potential in Africa, where needs are high but condi-
tions very diﬀerent (Kar & Milward, 2011). There have
undoubtedly been exaggerated claims. However, some of the
statistics cited as evidence of the failings of CLTS, such as that
“only” 39% of the CLTS villages examined in some studies
actually go on to become open defecation free (Mara et al.,
2010, p. 4), could also be read as very positive results.Creating a community-wide agreement on sanitary improve-
ment in most urban neighborhoods may require more organi-
zation than CLTS can provide, however. CLTS has not taken
oﬀ in urban areas as it has in rural (Kar, 2011, p. xiii). This is
not surprising. In urban areas there is more need for
infrastructural investment as opposed to just behavioral
change, and households cannot be expected to build the toilets
themselves without any assistance, owing to the higher cost
and greater skills required to build urban sanitation facilities,
the relative scarcity of land and diﬃculties securing relevant
permissions.
The principal lesson from CLTS is that community cooper-
ation can, in the right circumstances, radically increase the
eﬀective demand for sanitation at the community-scale. Simi-
lar lessons may apply to some of the other successful
approaches reported, such as the use of Community Health
Clubs in rural Zimbabwe, one of whose principles has been
to inﬂuence people in a coordinated group so that changes
were approved by group decision rather than expecting each
individual to take personal decisions (Waterkeyn &
Cairncross, 2005). This is likely to apply to urban as well as
rural areas, even if the means of tapping that demand may
need to be diﬀerent.
There is also a signiﬁcant urban literature on the important
role of community-based organizations in addressing the
shelter needs of low-income urban dwellers, including but
extending beyond improved sanitation (Satterthwaite &
Mitlin, 2014). Some of the better documented examples of
urban successes have involved networked community organi-
zations (often rooted in savings groups), supported by non-
governmental organizations that provide technical support
but not organizational or political leadership. The extent to
which other forms of local organization and leadership facili-
tate sanitary improvement has not been systematically
addressed, though anecdotal evidence suggests that communi-
ties often cooperate to address their sanitation problems, but
with diﬃculty.3. THE CHALLENGE OF COPRODUCTION
In a path-breaking article, Nobel Prize-winning economist
Elinor Ostrom argued that the sharp conceptual divide
between government and civil society is a trap, hiding the
potential synergies that can be gained from co-producing
goods and services (Ostrom, 1996). Deﬁning coproduction as
“a process through which inputs from individuals who are
not “in” the same organization are transformed into goods
and services”, she presented case studies of coproduction from
Brazil and Nigeria, concluding that “co-production of many
goods and services normally considered to be public goods
by government agencies and citizens organized into polycen-
tric systems is crucial for achieving higher levels of welfare
in developing countries, particularly for those who are poor”
(Ostrom, 1996, p. 1083).
Sanitation provided the basis for one of the case studies
Ostrom presented and continues to be prominent in a more
recent work on coproduction (Mitlin, 2008). There are many
reasons why sanitary improvements are often best co-pro-
duced, particularly in informal urban settlements. Some of
the reasons are related to the sorts of incentive problems
and competencies involved in collective action at diﬀerent
scales (community and city). But most important from the per-
spective of advocates of coproduction, by co-producing sani-
tation residents of informal settlements should be able to
secure better services from their governments, and in return
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behavior from some of their worst-oﬀ citizens.
In terms of incentive problems, communities are compara-
tively well situated to address sanitation’s neighborhood
collective action problems, but public utilities are far better
situated to deal with dealing with the collective action problem
posed by fecal sludge management (Peal, Evans, Blackett,
Hawkins, & Heymans, 2014), when it requires the treatment
and disposal of the waste outside of the community. Thus
the importance of coproduction for sanitation is related to
the way the collective action problems of low-cost sanitation
typically play out, with communities needing to take a lead
in supporting intra-community collective action, and larger
public sector actors needing to address the extra-community
collective action challenge.
In terms of relative competencies, community residents,
organizations, and local enterprises have a comparative
advantage in constructing and managing simple low-cost sys-
tems situated within the community, while public agencies,
utilities, and large contractors have a comparative advantage
in constructing and managing technologically sophisticated
systems centered outside of the community. This will tend to
reinforce the division of responsibilities suggested by the
incentive problems.
Condominial sewers, Ostrom’s Brazilian example (Ostrom,
1996), provide an example of a relatively high-end sanitation
system that can still be made aﬀordable in quite low-income
areas, provided it is coproduced. The condominial sewers
are smaller in diameter than conventional sewers, are laid less
deep, cost a third to half that of conventional sewerage and
can become cheaper than on-site systems as density increases
past about 150–200 people per hectare (Mara, 2012).
“Whereas conventional systems essentially provide services
to each housing unit, condominial systems deliver services to
each housing block or any group of dwellings that could be
termed a neighborhood unit or “condominium”.” (Melo,
2005). The condominial system drains to a point for treatment,
removal, or connection with a trunk sewer.
Even within Brazil, the elected neighborhood associations
formed to initiate the condominial sewers in diﬀerent areas
have played a range of diﬀerent roles, functioning variously
as advocates, service providers, and organizers of collective
action (Watson, 1995). The original justiﬁcation for engaging
with local residents, and getting their cooperation, was pri-
marily to keep costs down, to allow the residents to play a role
in designing the local system, and perhaps most important to
provide the capacity and responsibility for dealing with the
blockages that often arise with small diameter sewers. In
Brasilia alone, the condominial system has been used to extend
sewer connections to half a million people (Melo, 2005), and it
has also been deployed in a number of other cities.
The toilet block for shared or public use is a low-end sani-
tary facility that also works best when co-produced. Often,
public toilet blocks, or sometimes community toilet blocks
restricted to local residents, are built in low-income neighbor-
hoods by public agencies. It is common to see such toilet
blocks overﬂowing, broken down, used for other purposes
(e.g., for storage) or otherwise failing to fulﬁll their purpose.
Because of the diﬃculties often encountered with public and
shared toilets, in the monitoring of progress toward the global
sanitation target for 2015 such toilets are deﬁned as unim-
proved (though there are suggestions to allow as improved
toilets shared among a small number of households who know
each other (WHO/UNICEF, 2014)).
There have been some notable successes with shared and
toilet blocks, however, even in India where their frequentfailure has also been well documented (Sanan & Moulik,
2007). Successes have tended to come when either users
(Burra, Patel, & Kerr, 2003; McGranahan, 2013) or sanitation
workers (Pathak, 2011) have organized collectively and
co-produced the sanitation systems, with these organizations
taking primary responsibility for the operations of the facility
and government agencies taking responsibility for having the
human waste removed and disposed of or recycled safely.
In the examples of both successful condominial sewer sys-
tems and toilet blocks, community or worker involvement
has also helped to change the politics and policies of sanitary
provision at higher scales. Ostrom’s discussion of the condom-
inial systems makes explicit the link between the collective
action challenge and the coproduction challenge, and also
relates it to social capital: “the condominial system depends
on three diﬃcult challenges: (i) the organization of citizens
and their fulﬁllment of promises to undertake collective action
(what Tendler (1995) refers to as social capital outside the
government), (ii) good teamwork within a public agency (what
Tendler calls social capital within the government), and
(iii) eﬀective coordination between citizens” (Ostrom, 1996,
p. 1075). As Watson argues, when it is working well: “the
condominial system activates residents by engaging them
during project implementation, when service level, layout,
maintenance arrangements, and cost recovery mechanisms
are negotiated. This fosters an active, vocal constituency that
puts in motion the accountability mechanisms needed for
good agency performance” (Watson, 1995, p. 49).
Alternatively, in relation to the shared toilet blocks
Appadurai (2001) describes a co-operative representing
women’s savings groups using community-designed toilets to
“negotiate support and changed policies” and to further “deep
democracy” (these savings groups are part of the Alliance also
mentioned in the ﬁnal section of this article). In this case, the
state provides ﬁnancial and technical support. Such examples
indicate that coproduction is not just as a practical means of
overcoming management problems, but can potentially
become the means of radically transforming the politics of
practice (Albrechts, 2013). Equally, as some of the more ambi-
tious reﬂections on urban governance have highlighted, there
is considerable political potential in organizing around collec-
tive goods such as sanitation (Gandy, 2006).
With the wide array of technologies and institutional and
economic settings, there is an enormous range of diﬀerent
co-productive arrangements possible, and evidence suggests
that the arrangements matter. Even with the relatively
standardized condominial system, Nance and Ortolano
(2007) distinguish between having communities participate in
mobilizing, decision-making, construction, and maintenance.
They examined these diﬀerent forms of participation when
comparing three condominial sewer systems in Recife and four
in Natal. Participation in mobilizing and decision-making
was associated with better performance, while participation
in construction and maintenance was not. Such results suggest
that successful coproduction may require dialogic as well as
practical collaboration.
While the political advantages of coproduction attract the
most attention, some sanitation experts more concerned with
the technical obstacles to extending sanitation in informal set-
tlements have also advocated what amounts to coproduction.
Mara and Alabaster (2008) argue that provision should be
based on having service providers work with groups of resi-
dents, and that these groups should be required to cooperate
to manage their sanitation blocks, on-site sanitation systems,
or condominial sewers. In eﬀect, they make the practical case
for coproduction, even in the absence of dialogic collaboration.
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whether the initiative is coming from the public sector, from
the community, or from some third party. Social capital is
often scarce within the public sectors of low-income countries,
and also within informal settlements. Achieving eﬀective
cooperation between public and community organizations is
a tall order. However, the advantage that Ostrom ascribes to
coproduction is precisely that it helps to create social capital,
and can improve relations between public service users and
their governments. This would be particularly beneﬁcial where
residents often see the authorities as a threat and authorities
see residents as a nuisance or worse.4. THE CHALLENGE OF AFFORDABILITY VERSUS
ACCEPTABILITY
In simple terms, a sanitation system is aﬀordable to an indi-
vidual or institution if they have the necessary ﬁnancial or
other resources with which to acquire it, and do not have
higher priority uses for these resources. People on unaccept-
ably low incomes cannot be expected to aﬀord acceptable
sanitation any more than they can aﬀord acceptable clothing,
food, and other commodities. Unfortunately for people living
in poverty, regulations are often designed as if acceptable san-
itation were aﬀordable by deﬁnition. In practice, sanitation
considered acceptable by authorities is not only unaﬀordable
individually, but even collectively (i.e., even if the local public
good problem could be overcome). Moreover, publicly funded
sanitation providers often face their own aﬀordability chal-
lenges, with mandated prices and coverage targets that are
inconsistent with their revenues. And civil society organiza-
tions also face aﬀordability challenges, promoting sanitary
solutions that are too expensive to realistically scale up.
More speciﬁcally, three common manifestations of the chal-
lenge of aﬀordability conﬂicting with acceptability are:
 When sanitation standards for private sanitation facili-
ties are being set, they are often set so high that a signiﬁcant
share of the population could not aﬀord to meet them, even
if they overcame their local collective action challenges.
This can lead to the exclusion of low-income residents from
areas where sanitary regulations are strictly enforced, and
contribute to the creation of informal settlements that do
not conform to oﬃcial guidelines and regulations. 1
 When sanitation is provided through utilities, with prices
and coverage levels set by the public sector, it is common
for prices to be set at levels that would require subsidies
larger than the public agencies involved can aﬀord. The
typical result is for coverage targets to be sacriﬁced,
particularly in informal and low-income settlements, and
the limited subsidies to go to the relatively well-oﬀ.
 In pilot or demonstration projects, meant to provide the
basis for scaling up private or partially subsidized sanita-
tion provision, the sanitation technologies piloted often
cost so much that only relatively well-oﬀ residents can
aﬀord them once the subsidy built into the pilot project is
no longer available. Partly as a result, they have little
chance of being replicated, though they may establish a
precedent that later sanitation improvement programs are
expected to adhere to.
Before examining the basis for such aﬀordability problems,
it is worth noting that overcoming the collective action and
coproduction challenges described above can make sanitary
improvements at least seem more aﬀordable. Collective actioncan make sanitary improvement more aﬀordable in that indi-
viduals can achieve more beneﬁts from the same contribution
if others are contributing in tandem. Coproduction can also
make sanitary improvement more aﬀordable, both by reduc-
ing costs and at least potentially by shifting some of the ﬁnan-
cial burden to those better able to aﬀord it. More generally, to
the extent that collective action and coproduction lead to more
equitable decision-making this could make sanitation more
aﬀordable to those most in need. This applies to collective
decision-making within governments, within communities
and importantly also within households. Thus, for example,
if women had a greater say in household budget allocations,
one might expect more priority to be given to sanitary
improvements, and particularly those that favor women and
children.
The reasons that sanitation standards often fail to beneﬁt
those most in need derives from the nature of standards and
the ways in which even standards applied equally can have
inequitable consequences. In principle, and ignoring diﬀer-
ences between and among households, the collective action
problem posed by sanitation can be addressed by requiring
households and house owners to maintain certain minimum
standards, so that sanitation deﬁciencies do not impose undue
burdens on others. Ideally, such standards are clearly aﬀord-
able, in the sense that every household is better oﬀ when all
households make the sacriﬁces necessary to meet the standard.
However, in some cities and neighborhoods there is
evidence of strict standards being used successfully to exclude
low-income migrants (Feler & Henderson, 2011).
It is diﬃcult to know how common it is for high standards
to receive support because of their exclusionary tendencies,
but there is little doubt that high sanitary standards can
work against deprived households. Women in disadvantaged
households have been particularly prone to harassment
through high sanitary standards (though for other women
these same standards may have been liberating). In her socio-
economic history of women and class in Accra, Robertson
(1984, p. 34) notes that: “The sanitary inspectors became
the personiﬁcation of the colonial government for many res-
idents of Central Accra. In some years hundreds and even
thousands of women were prosecuted for having standing
water or ﬁlth in their compounds. So many women came
up before the District Court for sanitary oﬀenses that the
routine “he” referring to the accused in the court records
was eventually changed to a routine “she”.” Such overt
targeting of low-income women is not as acceptable within
government as it was in the colonial period, but the tendency
has been not so much to lower the oﬃcial standards, or
ﬁnd more aﬀordable means of achieving the same levels of
sanitation, but to reduce their enforcement.
In principle, standards negotiated collectively in low-income
settlements, but supported by local authorities, could provide
a means of securing more aﬀordable sanitation facilities. There
has been some experimentation along these lines with housing
standards in Sri Lanka (Jayaratne & Sohail, 2005). However,
neither residents nor their governments have much incentive to
advocate standards that oﬃcially accept facilities neither side
believes to be truly adequate, even if they are better than what
is available. Moreover, international actors and donors are
reluctant to accept standards that could be taken to condone
unsafe or degrading sanitation facilities. Indeed, recognition
of sanitation as a human right could be taken to preclude pri-
oritizing aﬀordability over acceptability. Locally, the compro-
mise of maintaining high standards but not enforcing them
tends to reinforce informality, which characterizes many other
dimensions of low-income urban settlements.
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low-income households to achieve sanitation standards that
would otherwise be unaﬀordable. Unfortunately, countries
where coverage is low typically also have low tax revenues
and little capacity or willingness to provide large subsidies
(which are currently out of favor with international develop-
ment agencies as well). Informality, in its various forms, can
be one of the reasons for low tax revenues and also for low
spend, as the residents of informal settlements can be
politically somewhat weakened or in the extreme even
disenfranchised by this informality. Underfunded but price-
controlled utilities will typically only be able to serve a small
share of the population, particularly with expensive technolo-
gies such as sewers and sewer connections. Under such condi-
tions, high standards can easily divert the limited subsidies
available to the middle-class households. The compromise
between a large subsidy that can make the sanitation services
aﬀordable to all and removing subsidies altogether has often
been small subsidies that attract the well-oﬀ but leave a signif-
icant share of the population unserved. This is often treated as
an inherent outcome of subsidizing water and sanitation
services, and has helped to give subsidies a bad name in the
water and sanitation sector. This is a misleading simpliﬁcation,
however, particularly given that the root of the problem is that
the pricing policy is not matched by the level of subsidy needed
to support it. This is as much a political as an economic
problem, and there is a clear contradiction between recogniz-
ing sanitation as a human right and refusing on principle to
subsidize its provision to those who cannot aﬀord it.
International and local NGOs sometimes play a signiﬁcant
role in improving sanitation in low-income settlements, and
they too have found it diﬃcult to identify sanitation facilities
that are both acceptable and aﬀordable. Most advocates of
CLTS have gone explicitly against this tendency by focusing
on the elimination of open defecation rather than the provi-
sion of a speciﬁc alternative. Many NGO initiatives are also
providing public or shared facilities in which sanitation is
accessed by several families. This has undoubtedly helped to
make them more aﬀordable and replicable. For more conven-
tional sanitation projects, however, there are likely to be
strong pressures to prioritize improvements that meet some
minimum standard over improvements that have the potential
to reach everyone in need. Indeed, this is implicit in the Millen-
nium Development Goal target of halving the share of the
population without access to basic sanitation during 1990–
2015 – this can be achieved without improving conditions at
all for other half of those without access to “improved”
sanitation, including any who will continue to share facilities.
More generally, a pilot sanitation project set up by an NGO
will be treated as a failure by funders and experts and users if
the facilities are not considered to be of acceptable quality, at
least while the project is still operational. Cost will also be a
concern, but the tendency will be to try to achieve a high
enough standard at the least cost, rather than to achieve an
aﬀordable improvement of the highest quality. This is espe-
cially the case if oﬃcial regulations or international guidelines
are inﬂuencing the choice of technology. As externally funded
projects try to expand coverage beyond the pilot scale, they
may well face pressure to demonstrate that large numbers of
households can be reached. Ironically, this can push coverage
toward the somewhat better oﬀ areas where people can aﬀord
the improvements with smaller subsidies.
There are a number of quite conventional measures, other
than subsidies and choosing low-cost technologies, that
can make sanitary improvements more aﬀordable. Savingsgroups and loans with reasonably low interest rates can help
households secure the ﬁnances needed to make lumpy
payments, such as for latrine construction. Training for
artisans can help to reduce the cost of constructing latrines
or other facilities. Eﬀorts to improve production technology
or secure returns to scale in sanitation facilities can reduce
costs on the supply side. As already indicated, measures that
give women more control over expenditures, including
sanitation, as well as making the decision to improve sanitary
conditions more collective, would be likely to increase the
amount that households would be willing to pay for sanita-
tion. Taken together, such changes could make a large
diﬀerence. In practical terms, however, identifying and
agreeing on aﬀordable sanitation options is almost inevitably
a serious challenge, and one that is compounded by the
considerable uncertainty surrounding the beneﬁts of sanitation
(Whittington, Jeuland, Barker, & Yuen, 2012).5. THE CHALLENGE OF ENSURING THAT TENURE
AND RELATED ISSUES DO NOT UNDERMINE THE
INCENTIVE TO IMPROVE SANITATION
Even utility-provided piped services can be undermined by
tenure problems. For example, utilities and local authorities
may not be allowed to provide sanitation and water services
to settlements considered to be unauthorized (Murthy,
2012). In other cases, they are not under any obligation
to do so, at least until the settlement has been recognized
by the government. This can apply to privately as well as
publically operated utilities. During the wave of privatiza-
tions initiated in the 1990s, the French water company Suez
Lyonnaise des Eaux prepared a manual on “Alternative
solutions for water supply and sanitation in areas with
limited ﬁnancial resources”, explicitly warning against sup-
plying settlements lacking tenure (Suez Lyonnaise des
Eaux, 1998).
It is also often claimed that tenure problems can reduce a
household’s incentive to improve their own home, and by
implication their incentives to invest in a sanitary toilet. After
all, if you may be evicted soon, why invest in a costly toilet?
Actually, the possible eﬀects on residents’ and homeowners’
incentives, and on the collective incentives of the residents,
are far more complicated than this suggests, and some of these
complications hinge on the diﬀerence between investing in
sanitary facilities (that will be lost in the event of a forced
departure) and adopting sanitary behaviors (which have
immediate beneﬁts). The threat of eviction undermines the
incentive to invest in sanitary improvement, but not the
incentive to engage in sanitary behavior. Insecure rental
tenure, on the other hand, undermines the investment incen-
tive for the people occupying the home, but may increase it
for the landlord, at least if they can extract higher rents. On
the other hand, when improvements can be expected to
increase the security of potential owner occupiers, by increas-
ing the legitimacy of the settlement, the tenure insecure may
have even more incentive to invest in improvements than
normal owner occupiers (Robinson, 2005).
Rental tenure can not only lead to sanitation problems
because of poor landlord–tenant relations, but also because
even collectively tenants have little incentive to improve neigh-
borhood sanitation conditions if the landlords are going to be
able to capture the beneﬁts through higher rents. In simple
economic terms, “A residential tenant’s maintenance of
the property and civic actions to enhance the quality of the
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er’s property, but cannot be speciﬁed in an enforceable con-
tract. Thus, tenants have little incentive to maintain the
property and to participate in enhancing local amenities”
(Bowles, 2012, p. 36). Issues of coproduction combine with
collective action problems here, since part of the problem is
that good neighborhood sanitation is coproduced by residents
and landlords, but if landlords are free to increase rents to a
rate set by the market, they will be able to extract all of the
beneﬁts. This is part of a broader set of issues involving strug-
gles with landlords (or structure owners in the case of informal
settlements where land ownership is not clear), which can eas-
ily undermine eﬀorts to upgrade low-income settlements and
beneﬁt their low-income residents (Rigon, 2014).
In addition to these more narrowly deﬁned tenure problems,
there are many other social, political, and other institutional
factors that can interfere with sanitary improvement, and
are especially prevalent in informal settlements. The collective
organizations that do exist may actively interfere with collec-
tive eﬃcacy in addressing sanitation problems. Thus, for
example, in the absence of rule of law, gangs making money
from trading in illegal drugs or other illegal merchandise
may emerge. These gangs are likely to undermine other forms
of organization within the community, particularly organiza-
tions led by men, which are likely to be perceived as a threat
to the gang. The gangs themselves may serve some social func-
tions, but are unlikely to be an appropriate organizational
form for sanitary improvement.
Political parties may engage in local organizing, but this is
often for the purposes of competing for support within the
community, which is again rarely an appropriate organiza-
tional form for sanitary improvement (thus, for example, the
local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution organized
local urban sanitation in 1980s Ghana, but political conﬂicts
undermined their continued operation (Osumanu, Abdul-
Rahim, Songsore, Braimah, & Mulenga, 2010, p. 8)). This
form of political organizing can interfere with local collective
action, and so too can the sort of political brokering done
informally to gain political support through distributing ben-
eﬁts. Research on low-income urban areas in Argentina has
shown the often corrosive eﬀects of political brokers who
“direct ﬂows of goods, information and services from their
political patrons to their clients and ﬂows of political support
(in the form of attendance at rallies, participation in party
activities, and sometimes votes) from their clients to their
patrons” (Auyero, 2007). Such political brokerage can easily
undermine attempts to develop collective decision-making on
local environmental problems (Almansi et al., 2011), but being
unoﬃcial is diﬃcult to challenge formally. Even when local
politicians are successfully pressured to invest in public goods
and may secure sanitation improvements, but problems of
maintenance are commonplace.
These physical and institutional conditions are closely inter-
twined with poverty, in its various guises (e.g., low incomes,
ill-health, lack of education, social exclusion, legal discrimina-
tion, political disempowerment). They are extremely diﬃcult
to address systematically and are well beyond the scope of a
project or program designed to improve sanitary facilities.
Often they are tacitly understood locally, but not well articu-
lated in any formal arenas. The resulting importance of local
knowledge and context provides one of the conventional justi-
ﬁcations for taking a participatory approach to sanitary
improvement, and also to integrated approaches to sanitary
provision that address other aspects of poverty including both
additional services and political employment (Ali & Stevens,
2009).6. OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES AND
REALIZING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SANITATION
Given the institutional challenges low-cost sanitation sys-
tems pose, it should not be surprising that sanitation provision
is lagging behind water provision and other developmental
targets. Hopefully, recognizing safe and clean sanitation as a
human right (United Nations General Assembly, 2010) will
help to overcome these challenges. As noted at the start of this
article however, there are divergent views on how human
rights should be pursued (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi,
2004; Miller, 2010; O’Leary, 2014), and reasons to believe that
the more legalistic strategies are ill-suited to addressing urban
sanitation deﬁciencies in low-income areas.
The focus of much human rights discourse on empowering
disadvantaged groups and holding authorities accountable
resonates with the challenges of fostering local collective
action and coproduction. The political and institutional
obstacles to improving sanitation in deprived urban settle-
ments justify the special attention implied by identifying
sanitation as a human right. On the other hand, these same
challenges can make it very diﬃcult to rely on rights-based
claims to demand improvements to sanitation from the state.
Indeed, the best known community-led eﬀorts to improve
sanitation in deprived urban areas have addressed the chal-
lenges using approaches very much at odd with those rights-
based approaches that put protests, court battles and making
demands on the state front and center (Mitlin & Patel, 2009).
Within the international water and sanitation sector, there
has been a tendency to interpret the rights to water and sani-
tation through legal lenses, and to argue, for example, that “a
rights-based approach to water and sanitation oﬀers interna-
tional legal standards by which to assess obligations, shifting
the consideration of rights from moral responsibility to legal
accountability” (Meier et al., 2014). It is relatively easy to
envisage how such a narrow rights-based approach could be
used to support the connection of low-income households to
expanding urban sewer networks. The utilities that operate
these networks may be diﬃcult to manage, particularly in
the absence of suﬃcient funding and a supportive regulatory
environment. But the state can be made accountable for driv-
ing their expansion. A narrowly rights-based approach could
advocate for progressive coverage targets with clearly speciﬁed
technologies and tariﬀs, leading toward universal coverage as
rapidly as can reasonably be expected. Utilities, their regula-
tors, and perhaps even their actual and potential funders
(including international donors) could in principle be held
accountable should the targets not be met.
It is more diﬃcult to see how a narrow rights-based
approach to sanitation can be pursued through lower cost
sanitation systems developed in a bottom-up fashion, and
overcoming the challenges of local collective action, coproduc-
tion, aﬀordability, and tenure security. Each of the challenges
complicates the pursuit of sanitation as a human right in a
somewhat diﬀerent way, particularly when that right is inter-
preted narrowly. A bottom-up approach would gain more
support if the right to sanitation were interpreted as an inte-
gral part of a broader human rights agenda, to be pursued
not only through “justiciable” remedies but through various
other forms of social counter power, negotiation of relations
between communities and the state, and political struggle
(Uvin, 2007, pp. 603–604 and others have argued that this
should be considered an integral part of the human rights
agenda).
Interpreting the right to sanitation narrowly, the collective
character of the local sanitation challenges pose awkward
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realized when an individual or household faces unsanitary
conditions because of the sanitary facilities of others – those
who face the unpleasantness and risks, those who lack the
facilities, or both? On the other hand, interpreting human
rights as justifying remedies involving social organization
and struggle, the collective action challenge could be taken
to justify local organization to achieve the right to sanitation.
This interpretation also has a legal dimension, but of broader
scope than the right to sanitation per se, and it is more sup-
portive of eﬀorts to meet the collective challenges that sanita-
tion poses.
That good low-cost sanitation needs to be co-produced also
poses awkward questions for a narrow approach to the right
to sanitation, such as who is to be held to account when
needed coproduction by a utility and a community does not
take place – uncooperative community members, the utility,
its regulators and funders, or perhaps all of these? An interpre-
tation more supportive of social struggle and negotiation
would be that eﬀective and equitable coproduction involves
precisely the sort of redeﬁnition of relations between citizens
and the state that a rights-based approach should support.
For the aﬀordability challenge a narrow rights-based
approach raises unhelpful questions about whether and if so
when prioritizing aﬀordability over acceptability can be justi-
ﬁed. A more politically sophisticated interpretation would be
that a rights-based approach demands that the contradiction
between aﬀordability and acceptability becomes part of the
platform for pursuing the sort of higher level structural
changes that will ensure that what is aﬀordable is acceptable.
Under such an interpretation, even if aﬀordability must take
precedence in certain arenas, this does not make the outcome
acceptable. It could be argued that this interpretation is impli-
cit in the demand for the “progressive realization” of human
rights (Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commission for
Human Rights, 2008).
Finally, the extent to which tenure issues undermine sanita-
tion improvement awkward questions about a rights-based
approach that focusses narrowly on sanitation. Here, a
broader socio-political interpretation would be that govern-
ments are violating their obligations to respect the human
right to water and sanitation when they refuse to allow sanita-
tion services to be extended to neighborhoods because of ten-
ure issues (Murthy, 2012), and that the right to sanitation also
calls into question the legitimacy of tenure systems that under-
mine access.Table 1. Summary of the institutional challenges of improving sanitation in depr
initiativ
Institutional challenges
1. The collective action challenge: Bad local sanitation is a collective
problem that people in deprived neighborhoods cannot be expected to
confront individually
2. The coproduction challenge: Even well-organized communities cannot
take responsibility for what happens to human waste once out of the
neighborhood, while the public sector and its utilities are rarely able and
willing to provide and maintain sanitation facilities in informal settlements
3. The challenge of aﬀordability versus acceptability: Technological
‘solutions’ that governments and the residents of informal settlements can
agree are acceptable, they also ﬁnd to be unaﬀordable, and vice versa
4. The tenure challenge: Local urban sanitary and water deﬁciencies are
ampliﬁed by poverty-related problems, including most notably tenure
issues, that cannot be addressed from within a narrow water and sanitation
agendaThe challenges can also be examined in terms of how suc-
cessful eﬀorts to improve sanitation have managed to over-
come them. Two of the most successful and sustained
attempts to upgrade sanitation in and with deprived urban
communities are those of the Orangi Pilot Project (hereafter
OPP) in Karachi and the Alliance of Mahila Milan, SPARC
and the Indian National Federation of Slum Dwellers in Pune
and Mumbai (hereafter the Alliance). Both have been well
documented (Appadurai, 2001; Burra et al., 2003; Hasan,
2010; McGranahan, 2013; Patel et al., 2014, manuscript in
preparation; Pervaiz, Rahman, & Hasan, 2008). Although
based in diﬀerent countries and involving quite diﬀerent tech-
nologies, both eschewed the approach of making rights-based
claims for the government to provide conventional sanitation
solutions. Instead they developed alternative approaches, ini-
tially resisted and treated as overly political, but eventually
endorsed and coproduced by the local public sector sanitation
providers. Table 1 summarizes in simpliﬁed terms how these
successful community-driven approaches have managed to
overcome each of the challenges.
In terms of the collective action challenge, both of the initia-
tives involved concerted attempts to organize community
members in such a way that their demands could be articu-
lated and acted on collectively. The “component-sharing mod-
el” of the OPP, for example, makes the lane, with around
20–40 households, the informal unit responsible for building
and maintaining the sewer going down their lane (Pervaiz
et al., 2008, p. 59). Community toilet blocks were favored by
the Alliance in Mumbai and Pune in part because they
provided a good basis for community organizing.
Both of the initiatives took advantage of both the practi-
cal suitability and the strategic potential of co-producing
sanitary improvement, and used coproduction to secure
more public support for locally driven sanitary improve-
ment. In Karachi the division between “internal” and
“external” infrastructure, with lane residents responsible
for the former and the public provider for the latter, is
central to the model of collaboration. Over time the OPP
approach has become part of the mainstream and is
reﬂected in the national sanitation plans, which rely on a
signiﬁcant level of coproduction. In Mumbai and Pune,
the choice of sanitation was related to coproduction from
the start, with the public sector typically responsible for
the ﬁnal waste disposal and usually for capital costs, but
with community organizations also co-producing both
the sanitary facilities and playing a lead role in theirived urban neighborhoods and related responses of two successful grassroots
es
Response of successful grassroots initiatives
Responses were rooted in community organization, and the
collective nature of problems became part of the justiﬁcation for
collective action
Improvements were co-produced by coordinated measures on the
part of both community residents and the oﬃcial utility, both
addressing the technical challenge and making the utility more
responsive to community needs
Conventional solutions meeting all oﬃcial standards and
community aspirations were rejected in favor of aﬀordable
solutions that come as close as possible to being acceptable
Sanitary and water improvements were embedded in a broader
poverty agenda, extending to issues of tenure security
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and eventually national approaches to urban sanitation
improvement.
Both of the OPP and the Alliance privileged aﬀordability
over meeting conventional sanitation guidelines, and used
technologies considered to be sub-standard within the formal
water and sanitation establishment. The OPP relied on work-
ing with a simpliﬁed sewer system, and already in the early
1980s identiﬁed as a key obstacle the economic barrier of not
being able to aﬀord to cover the costs of conventional sanita-
tion facilities (Pervaiz et al., 2008). In Mumbai and Pune the
success of the Alliance centered on working to improve the
design and management of communal toilets (Burra et al.,
2003), although most international experts in the water and
sanitation sector have been inclined to treat all communal toi-
lets as inadequate (as demonstrated by the decision by the
UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Program to exclude house-
holds using shared toilets from estimates of households with
“improved” sanitation (WHO/UNICEF, 2014)).Both OPP and the Alliance started out with agendas far
broader than the water and sanitation sector. Their work on san-
itation emerged from lengthy dialogs within low-income com-
munities. Both sets of institutions also work on a range of
other shelter issues, including those related to land tenure, and
draw heavily on the knowledge and experience developed in
the course of this other work. And in both cases there are good
reasons to believe that if sanitation ceased to be a local priority,
it would also cease to be a priority for OPP and the Alliance.
A companion article to this one is planned, and will include
a more detailed analysis of how these two community-driven
sanitation initiatives managed to meet the challenges, scale
up, and inﬂuence city-wide and national sanitation programs.
For the purposes of this article, it is worth observing that while
neither used the language of human rights, and both implicitly
distanced themselves from narrowly “rights-based” approaches,
they could both be said to represent a more locally grounded
and politically pragmatic approach to realizing the right to
sanitation.NOTES1. The criteria used by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program to
distinguish “improved” from “unimproved” sanitation (WHO/UNICEF,
2014, p. 40) treat as improved unshared facilities based on: ﬂush/pour
toilets draining to a tank or sewer, ventilated improved pit latrines, pit
latrines with a slab or composting toilets. This distinction is not presented
as a standard or even a guideline (the term used to refer to WHO advice
intended to be useful to countries developing standards), but as the basisfor monitoring progress toward the Millennium Development Goal
sanitation target. Oﬃcial standards adopted for use by utilities and
government agencies are likely to be inﬂuenced by such indicator criteria,
but can be considerably more demanding. CLTS, on the other hand, does
not rely on technical standards to determine what sorts of toilet facilities
should be promoted, drawing considerable criticism from some technical
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